


























CARF is presently supported by Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.,  Citigroup,  Dai-ichi 
Mutual Life Insurance Company, Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Company, Nippon Life Insurance 
Company, Nomura Holdings, Inc. and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (in alphabetical 
















Working Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form.  They are not intended for 
circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author.  For that reason Working Papers may 
not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author. 
   
CARF-F-243 
 




The University of Tokyo   
Noriyuki Yanagawa 
The University of Tokyo 
 
January 2011 Exclusive Dealing Contracts by Distributors
Ryoko Oki￿and Noriyuki Yanagaway
January 14, 2011
Abstract
The existing literature about exclusive dealing contracts has focused on cases
where an incumbent manufacturer o⁄ers exclusive contracts to deter an entry. In
contrast, we consider the case where an incumbent distributor o⁄ers exclusive dealing
contracts to deter an entry. Exclusive dealing contracts by a distributor are less
e⁄ective. We will show that the outcome of such contracts is quite di⁄erent from the
outcomes in the traditional literature. If the number of manufacturers is su¢ ciently
high, it is impossible to exclude an e¢ cient entry. Furthermore, if we allow two-
part tari⁄ contracts, the entrant distributor can enter the market for any number of
manufacturers.
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11 Introduction
Whether exclusive dealing contracts prevent e¢ cient entries is one of the main issues dis-
cussed in the economic literature on vertical restraints. Recently, Simpson and Wickelgren
(2007) extended this issue to the case where a manufacturer o⁄ers exclusive dealing con-
tracts to downstream distributors.1 This strand of literature examines cases where one
large incumbent manufacturer faces a potential e¢ cient entrant. The results of these stud-
ies have a strong impact on the literature about exclusive dealing contracts. Simpson and
Wickelgren (2007) have shown that in almost perfect competition at the distribution level,
exclusive dealing contracts are signed by all distributors with up-front payment arbitrarily
close to zero.2
In this paper, we consider the case where an incumbent distributor facing a rival￿ s entry
o⁄ers exclusive dealing contracts to manufacturers. We will show that the outcome of such
exclusive dealing contracts is quite di⁄erent from the outcomes in the traditional literature.
We will show that as long as the number of manufacturers is su¢ ciently high, it is impossible
to exclude an e¢ cient entry. Furthermore, if we allow two-part tari⁄contracts, the entrant
distributor can enter the market for any number of manufacturers.
Traditionally, the economic literature has focused on cases wherein vertical restraints
are initiated by manufacturers or suppliers, that is, upstream ￿rms. In many industries,
however, we observe cases where downstream ￿rms o⁄er vertical restraints to manufactur-
ers. As Miklos-Thal et al. (forthcoming) and Inderst and Wey (2007) point out, such cases
occur especially in the grocery industry.3 For example, large supermarket chains request
slotting allowance payments to manufacturers. Miklos-Thal et al. (forthcoming) state, ￿ In
France, manufacturers have long been complaining about the growing magnitude of slotting
1Though Fumagalli and Motta (2006) introduce a distributor into the entry deterrence model, Simpson
and Wickelgren (2007) have proved more robust results without Fumagalli and Motta￿ s ad-hoc assumption.
See also Wright (2009) for a discussion on Fumagalli and Motta￿ s result on two part tari⁄s.
2In Simpson and Wickelgren (2007), the exclusive dealing contract is breachable by paying expectation
damages. At the equilibrium where all distributors sign contracts, an entrant can enter the market with
one breaching distributor. However, at this equilibrium, the retail market price is as high as in the case of
upstream monopoly.
3Inderst and Wey (2007) suggest that we can observe a similar situation in media industry as well.
2allowances and hidden rebates and these practices have been at the center of the debate
about the 2￿ 5 reform of the 1996 Galland Act￿ . Comanor and Rey (2000) present two
antitrust cases of exclusive dealing contracts initiated by distributors. One is the Toys ￿ R￿
Us case and the other is the Belk case. Toys ￿ R￿Us is the largest toy retailer in the United
States and it faced intense competition with new warehouse clubs, for example Sam￿ s club
(a division of Wal-Mart), Costco, and so many others in the 1990￿ s. Toys ￿ R￿Us o⁄ered
exclusive dealing contracts to major toy manufacturers, such as Mattel, in order to pre-
vent their rivals￿access to major toy products. Similarly, Belk, a department store chain
with more than 400 retail outlets in the United States, also faced a competitive rival￿ s en-
try: a discounter, Garment District. Belk o⁄ered exclusive dealing contracts to sportswear
manufacturers and tried to prevent them from selling their products to Garment District.
A debate on vertical restraints initiated by distributors is growing even from a compe-
tition policy perspective. Regarding exclusive dealing contracts, the European Commission
is working for a revision of the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption Regulation and the
related guidelines on supply and distribution agreements concerning the increased buyer
power of large retailers.4 According to the revised regulation, ￿ the Commission proposes
that for a vertical agreement to bene￿t from the block exemption, not only the supplier￿ s
market share (as is currently the case) but also the buyer￿ s market share should not exceed
30%￿ .5 The commission is concerned that with this regulation large distributors backed by
their buying power could soften competition by restricting suppliers￿deals. At the time
of announcing the new rule, the European Commission states, ￿ We have found that big
distributors can also use their buyer power to impose anti-competitive contractual clauses
on suppliers, to the detriment of competition and consumers￿ . 6
As far as we know, there are not many articles considering vertical restraints initiated
by distributors. Regarding the slotting allowance, Marx and Sha⁄er (2007) and Miklos-
Thal et al. (forthcoming) examine the case where distributors request slotting allowance
for manufacturers. In this paper, we focus on another vertical restraint, exclusive deal-
4The new rule became e⁄ective in June 2010 with a one-year transitional phase.
5The European Commission press release, July 28, 2009.
6The European Commission press release, April 20, 2010. This comment was made by Joaquin Almunia,
vice president of the European Commission responsible for competition policy.
3ing contracts. We consider a case where distributors o⁄er exclusive dealing contracts to
manufacturers.
In the literature on exclusive dealing contracts, Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and
Whinston (2000) have shown that exclusive dealing contracts may deter e¢ cient entries.
They have shown that buyers may not reject the exclusive dealing o⁄er from an incumbent
manufacturer when an entrant has to pay a su¢ cient amount of entry cost. The reason
is that the sales amount to a rejected buyer (or free buyer) is insu¢ cient and the entrant
cannot cover the ￿xed entry cost. Hence, there is a possibility that all buyers accept the
exclusive dealing contract.
Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) and Abito and Wright (2008) incorporate product dif-
ferentiation of downstream ￿rms. They have proved that there is an equilibrium where all
distributors sign the exclusive dealing contract with compensation close to zero as down-
stream competition is almost perfect.7 Second, since the compensation required by the
distributors to sign the exclusive contracts is zero, the number of distributors does not
a⁄ect the possibility of exclusion; the incumbent can induce all distributors to sign the
exclusive dealing contract, no matter how many distributors exist.
This paper shows that even if an incumbent distributor tries to deter an e¢ cient en-
trant distributor by o⁄ering exclusive dealing contracts to manufacturers, it is di¢ cult to
deter the entry. In this sense, the e⁄ectiveness of an exclusive dealing contract o⁄ered
by a distributor is quite di⁄erent from that o⁄ered by a manufacturer. Exclusive dealing
contracts by a distributor are less e⁄ective. Crucial to our argument is that a manufacturer
who has refused an exclusive dealing contract (called a ￿free manufacturer￿ ) has a strong
bargaining position with regard to an entrant distributor. Since only a free manufacturer
7As Fumagalli and Motta (2006) and Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) show, there exists multiplicity of
the equilibria in the homogenous Bertrand competition. The source of multiplicity is the indeterminacy
of the deviation pro￿t of distributors. If one distributor rejects the exclusive contract, the incumbent
manufacturer can o⁄er the signed distributors any wholesale price. However low the incumbent￿ s o⁄ers
are, it does not a⁄ect their pro￿t; one free distributor can obtain the entire ￿nal consumer demand by
purchasing from the entrant at a price slightly lower than the incumbent￿ s production cost. Fumagalli and
Motta (2006) exclude multiplicity by assuming additional ￿xed cost (only) for distributors. It leads to
unique entry equilibria in contrast to the result of Simpson and Wickelgren (2007).
4can supply a product to the entrant distributor, the free manufacturer can absorb the high
pro￿t of an entrant distributor. Hence, the necessary compensation level for signing the
exclusive contract becomes very high, and it is impossible to convince all manufacturers
to sign an exclusive dealing contract. On the other hand, in the traditional literature,
an incumbent manufacturer o⁄ers an exclusive dealing contract to distributors in order to
deter an e¢ cient entrant manufacturer. Even in this case, only the distributor who refused
the exclusive dealing contract can trade with the entrant. In this situation, however, the
free distributor has to compete with those who signed at the retail market. Thus, the free
distributor cannot get any extra bene￿t, and it is easy for an incumbent manufacturer to
convince all distributors to sign an exclusive dealing contract.
In our basic model, we examine a sequential Bertrand competition model. We also
extend our basic setting and manufacturers are allowed to o⁄er two-part tari⁄contracts. In
the traditional literature, two-part tari⁄s enhance the exclusion of an entrant manufacturer.
Our argument obtains quite the opposite result. If manufacturers are allowed to o⁄er two-
part tari⁄ contracts, the incumbent distributor cannot deter entry even if the number of
manufacturers is small.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our basic model. In Section
3, we examine the model allowing two-part tari⁄ contracts by manufacturers. Section 4
concludes this paper and presents some policy implications.
2 The Model: Sequential Bertrand Competition
We present a simple manufacturer-distributor model. There are N (N ￿ 2) identical
manufacturers (M) whose constant marginal cost is c and they produce homogenous goods.
There is no ￿xed cost for the production. Downstream of the market, there is one incumbent
distributor (I) who faces a potential entrant distributor (E). The marginal distribution cost
of the incumbent distributor is dI and that of the entrant distributor is dE. We assume
that dI > dE, and thus the entrant is more e¢ cient as compared to the incumbent. For
simplicity, we assume that E pays no entry cost.8 We assume that two distributors compete
8We examine the cases where the entry cost is positive, in Section 3.
5a la Bertrand facing a demand function given by X = X(p). As a standard assumption,
@X(p)=@p < 0, where p is the retail price. First, we have the demand function with retail
price o⁄ers of both distributors denoted by pi for i = I;E as below:
X(p) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
X(pi) if pi < pj
X(pi)=2 if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj
: (1)
Then, we de￿ne the pro￿t function for each distributor denoted by ￿(p;C),
￿i(p;C) = (p ￿ C)X(p); i = I;E; (2)
with marginal cost of a distributor denoted by C. Obviously, C consists of marginal
production cost and marginal distribution cost. When a distributor can monopolize the




p (p ￿ C)X(p); (3)
p
m(C) = argmax
p (p ￿ C)X(p): (4)
We assume that the pro￿t function satis￿es a condition so that pm(C) is uniquely deter-
mined.
Now we have the payo⁄ of distributor i = I;E with respect to its retail price strategy
denoted by pi, given its competitor￿ s strategy (denoted by pj) and its marginal cost (denoted
by Ci). Let ￿i(pi;pj;Ci) denote distributor i￿ s pro￿t, which is speci￿ed as follows:
￿i(pi;pj;Ci) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
(pi ￿ Ci)X(pi) if pi < pj
(pi ￿ Ci)X(pi)=2 if pi = pj
0 if pi > pj
: (5)
Then, the reaction function of each distributor in the retail price competition stage is
the same as a standard Bertrand competition. It is given as follows:
pi(pj;Ci) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
pm(Ci) if pj > pm(Ci)
pj ￿ " if pm(Ci) ￿ pj > Ci
Ci if Ci ￿ pj
for i = I;E: (6)
To reduce the notation, we assume that " is a small parameter with lim" ! 0. Then we





> > > <
> > > :
pm(Ci) if Cj > pm(Ci)
Cj if pm(Ci) ￿ Cj > Ci
Ci if Ci ￿ Cj
for i = I;E: (7)





> > > <
> > > :
￿m(Ci) if Cj > pm(Ci)
(Cj ￿ Ci)X(Cj) if pm(Ci) ￿ Cj > Ci
0 if Ci ￿ Cj
for i = I;E: (8)
7For simplicity, we assume that pm(c + dE) > c + dI, that is, the e¢ ciency gap between the
incumbent and entrant distributor is not large enough for the entrant to o⁄er a monopoly
price when no exclusive dealing contract is e⁄ective.
The game runs as follows. At t=0, the incumbent o⁄ers manufacturers the exclusive
contracts, and the manufacturers decide whether to accept them or not.9 S(￿ N) denotes
the number of signed manufacturers. An exclusive dealing contract stipulates a signer to
supply goods only to the incumbent. In return, a compensation x is paid for the signer in
order to induce manufacturers to sign the contract. The amount of x is also stipulated in
the contract. As assumed in the related literature, any commitments on wholesale prices
or distribution margins are not included in the contract. As a standard assumption, if
manufacturers are indi⁄erent whether to sign or reject the contract, they sign it. We
further assume that contracts cannot be breached. Our analysis is focused on simultaneous
and nondiscriminatory o⁄ers of exclusive dealing contracts. At t=1, the e¢ cient entrant
distributor, having observed S, decides either to enter the market or not to. The entrant
enters the market when it can obtain non negative pro￿t.
At t=2, we have three stages. First, each manufacturer o⁄ers wholesale prices to active
distributors. Let ws,and wI
f denote the wholesale price o⁄ered by a signed manufacturer
to the incumbent, by a free manufacturer to the incumbent, and let wE
f denote the free
manufacturer￿ s price to the entrant. Second, distributors decide to accept the wholesale
price o⁄ers. Finally, distributors engage in retail price competition a la Bertrand. Here
we adopt the tie-break rule as in the literature. The most e¢ cient ￿rm wins the price
competition if the o⁄ers are the same. We look for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
this game and examine the e⁄ect of e¢ cient entry downstream.10
First, we consider the possible continuation games after S is determined as S = 0;:::;N￿
1;N, and obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (i) If S = N, (i-1)￿ (i-4) are the equilibrium outcomes.
(i-1) The entrant distributor does not enter the market.
9We call a manufacturer who signs the exclusive dealing contract as a signed manufacturer, on the other
hand, a manufacturer who does not sign the exclusive dealing contract as a free manufacturer.
10Here, we consider the weak concept of subgame perfection. As long as there is no strictly positive
deviation incentive, that is the quilibrium behavior.
8(i-2) All manufacturers o⁄er ws = c.
(i-3) The incumbent distributor accepts the o⁄er ws = c.
(i-4) The retail price becomes pm(c + dI). The incumbent obtains the monopoly pro￿t
￿m(c + dI). All manufacturers obtains zero.
(ii) If S = N ￿ 1, (ii-1)￿ (ii-4) are the equilibrium outcomes.
(ii-1) The entrant distributor enters the market.
(ii-2) The manufacturers￿o⁄ers are as follows: ws = c, wI
f ￿ c, wE
f = c + (dI ￿ dE).
(ii-3) The incumbent distributor accepts the o⁄er ws = c and the entrant distributor
accepts the o⁄er wE
f = c + (dI ￿ dE).
(ii-4) The retail price becomes P = c+dI. The distributors and the signed manufacturers
obtain zero. The free manufacturer obtains R￿
f = (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI).
(iii)If S ￿ N ￿ 2, (iii-1)￿ (iii-4) are the equilibrium outcomes.
(iii-1) The entrant distributor enters the market.
(iii-2) The manufacturers￿o⁄ers are as follows: ws = c, wI
f ￿ c, wE
f = c.
(iii-3) The incumbent distributor accepts the o⁄er ws = c and the entrant distributor
accepts the o⁄er wE
f = c:
(iii-4) The retail price becomes P = c + dI. The incumbent distributors and the manu-
facturers obtain zero. The entrant distributor obtains (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI).
Proof. Consider three cases separately, (i) S = N, (ii) S = N ￿ 1, and (iii) S ￿ N ￿ 2.
(i) Since all manufacturers have signed the exclusive dealing contracts, they compete
with prices for the incumbent distributor￿ s purchase. Thus each manufacturer o⁄ers ws = c
at the equilibrium. The entrant distributor obviously cannot enter the market. Since all
wholesale prices are the same, the incumbent distributor accepts the wholesale price ws = c,
and obtains the monopoly pro￿t ￿m(c + dI) by pricing pm(c + dI).
(ii) If S = N ￿ 1, only one manufacturer is free and can o⁄er the wholesale price to
the entrant distributor. Other N ￿ 1 signed manufacturers have to sell to the incumbent
distributor. Assume that an entrant distributor enters the market. Because the entrant
distributor￿ s cost is lower than the incumbent￿ s, the optimal pricing (wE
f ;wI
f) for the free









f + dE ￿ min(ws;wI
f) + dI:
In order that the entrant may win the retail price competition, the total marginal cost for
the entrant, wE
f +dE, cannot exceed the total marginal cost for the incumbent, min(ws;wI
f)+
dI. Since the incumbent can choose the wholesale price o⁄er from signed manufacturers (ws)
or the free manufacturer (wI
f), the total marginal cost for the incumbent is min(ws;wI
f)+dI.
Obviously, the free manufacturer has no incentive to o⁄er wI
f < ws. Hence, the best
responses become wE
f = ws + dI ￿ dE ￿ " where " is small parameter with lim" ! 0,
and wI
f ￿ ws. On the other hand, the optimal behaviors of signed manufacturers are
rather simple. If there are two or more than two signed manufacturers, by simple price
competition among them, ws becomes c. Even if there is only one signed manufacturer
(N ￿ 1 = 1), the best response is ws = c because the incumbent distributor is less cost
e¢ cient than the entrant distributor. As a result, the equilibrium wholesale prices become
wE
f = c + dI ￿ dE ￿ " where " is a small parameter with lim" ! 0, wI
f ￿ c, and ws = c.
Under those wholesale prices, the entrant distributor wins the retail price competition by
pricing c + dI, however with zero pro￿t. Only the free manufacturer can obtain a positive
pro￿t, (wE
f ￿ c)X(min(ws;wI
f) + dI) = (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI). Since the pro￿t of the entrant
is slightly positive ", the entrant enters the market if S = N ￿ 1:
(iii) If S = N ￿ 2, two or more manufacturers are free. Assume that the entrant
distributor enters the market. The free manufacturers compete with their wholesale prices
to the entrant. Thus, wE
f = c. On the other hand, the optimal o⁄er of each signed
manufacturer is ws = c. As in the case of (ii), wI
f should not be lower than c. Thus, wI
f ￿ c
is the optimal strategy for the free manufacturers as long as wE
f = c. Hence, by retail price
competition, the entrant distributor obtains (dI ￿dE)X(c+dI) by pricing c+dI ￿" where
" is small with lim" ! 0, and the incumbent distributor gets zero pro￿t. As in the case of
(ii), the entrant chooses to enter the market.
Now, we consider the manufacturers￿decision at t=0. Each manufacturer has an equal
chance to become the free manufacturer. Therefore, in order to induce all manufacturers
10to sign the contract, the incumbent is required to compensate each manufacturer at least
(dI￿dE)X(c+dI). To cover the total amount of compensation, Nx￿ = N(dI￿dE)X(c+dI),
the incumbent￿ s monopoly pro￿t ￿m(c + dI) must be equal to or higher than Nx￿. Hence,
we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The incumbent distributor cannot deter an e¢ cient entrant if the number
of upstream ￿rms is larger than N￿ = ￿m(c + dI)=(dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI).
Proof. Since all manufacturers have an incentive to be a free manufacturer and ob-
tains Rf = (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI), the incumbent distributor has to pay at least Rf to
each manufacturer in order to realize S = N. Only when S = N, the incumbent can
obtain ￿m(c + dI) but receives zero pro￿t otherwise. Thus, as long as ￿m(c + dI) ￿
N(dI ￿dE )X(c+dI), the incumbent can pro￿tably o⁄er the exclusive dealing contract to
all N manufacturers and the entrant distributor cannot enter the market. Then, we de￿ne
N￿ = ￿m(c + dI)=(dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI), and if N￿ ￿ N, then the incumbent can make all
manufacturers sign the exclusive dealing contracts.
However, if ￿m(c + dI) < N(dI ￿ dE )X(c + dI), it is not pro￿table for the incumbent
to o⁄er exclusive dealing contracts with the necessary compensation. In other words, the
incumbent cannot deter the entrant distributor if ￿m(c + dI) < N(dI ￿ dE )X(c + dI).
This proposition implies that the e⁄ectiveness of the exclusive dealing contract by the
incumbent distributor is limited. If the number of manufacturers is su¢ ciently large, entry
deterrence by an exclusive dealing contract is not successful, and an entrant distributor
with a more e¢ cient technology can enter the market. The crucial point for this result is
the positive gain of the free manufacturer, Rf = (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI) > 0. By rejecting
the exclusive dealing o⁄er, a manufacturer becomes a monopoly supplier to the entrant
distributor and obtains the positive gain, Rf. This means that, in order to convince a
manufacturer, the incumbent distributor has to compensate the positive gain Rf. On the
other hand, the incumbent can realize the monopoly gain only when all manufacturers
sign the contract. Hence, it becomes impossible to block entry if there are too many
manufacturers since the incumbent cannot pay such large compensations. It implies that
11as long as the upstream market is su¢ ciently competitive, in the sense the number of
manufacturers is large, no ine¢ ciency occurs.
This result is di⁄erent from the case where an incumbent manufacturer o⁄ers an exclu-
sive dealing contract to distributors. As explained in the introduction, exclusive dealing
o⁄ers from an incumbent manufacturer to distributors are examined in the traditional liter-
ature (Simpson and Wickelgren, 2007; Abito and Wright, 2008; Fumagalli and Motta, 2006;
and Wright, 2009). According to the traditional literature, an exclusion by the incumbent
manufacturer can be successful. In those situations, even if a distributor rejects an exclu-
sive dealing o⁄er from the incumbent manufacturer, it cannot obtain any pro￿t because
of the competition e⁄ect among distributors. Hence, the competition at the downstream
market generates ine¢ cient entry deterrence. However, when an incumbent distributor
tries to deter an entrant distributor, a manufacturer can obtain positive gain by rejecting
the exclusive dealing contract. This di⁄erence becomes more drastic if manufacturers use
two-part tari⁄ contracts. We will examine this point in the next section.
As explored by Simpson and Wickelgren (2007), if there is no product di⁄erentiation
and all distributors sell homogenous goods, there are multiple types of equilibria when
an incumbent distributor o⁄ers exclusive dealing contracts. The main reason is that the
wholesale price o⁄er from an incumbent manufacturer to a signed distributor can be inde-
terminate. In the case of an exclusive dealing o⁄er from an incumbent distributor, there
are no multiple types of equilibria under homogenous goods competition. With many man-
ufacturers there exist no equilibria in which entry is excluded. Even in our setting, the
wholesale price o⁄er from a free manufacturer to the incumbent is indeterminate and can
be wI
f ￿ c. However, this indeterminacy does not a⁄ect the positive gain of the free man-
ufacturer Rf = (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI). Hence, the outcome is uniquely determined and the
entrant can enter the market if the number of manufacturers is larger than N￿.
3 Wholesale Contract in Two-part Tari⁄s
In this section, we extend our analysis to the case where a two-part tari⁄ type wholesale
contract is available at the ￿rst stage, t=2. The wholesale contract consists of a unit
12wholesale price and a ￿xed fee, denoted by w and f , respectively.11 At t=2, we still have
three stages. First, each manufacturer o⁄ers wholesale contracts to active distributors. A
manufacturer o⁄ers two-part tari⁄s to each distributor which consisting of a non-negative
per-unit wholesale price w and a possibly negative ￿xed fee f, written in the form (w;
f). Let wi
j and fi
j denote, respectively the per-unit wholesale price and ￿xed fee o⁄ered
by manufacturer j to distributor i, where j = s;f and i = I;E. Second, each distributor
decides whether to accept the o⁄er. We assume that a distributor can accept only one
wholesale contract.12 Finally, distributors engage in retail price competition a la Bertrand.
All remaining settings are the same as in the previous section. We look for a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium and examine the e⁄ect of e¢ cient entry downstream. Consider
possible continuation games after S is determined as S = 0;:::;N ￿ 1;N.
Lemma 2 (i) If S = N, (i-1)￿ (i-4) are the equilibrium outcomes.
(i-1) The entrant distributor does not enter the market.
(i-2) All manufacturers o⁄er (c;0) to the incumbent distributor.
(i-3) The incumbent distributor accepts the o⁄er (c;0).
(i-4) The retail price becomes pm(c+dI). The incumbent obtains monopoly pro￿t ￿m(c+dI).
All manufacturers obtain zero pro￿t.
(ii) If S = N ￿ 1, (ii-1)￿ (ii-4) are the equilibrium outcomes.
(ii-1) The entrant distributor enters the market.
(ii-2) N ￿ 1 signed manufacturers o⁄er (c;0) to the incumbent distributor. The one free
manufacturer o⁄ers (wI
f;0) to the incumbent distributor and (c;￿m(c+dE)) to the entrant
distributor, where wI
f ￿ pm(c + dE) ￿ dI.
(ii-3) The incumbent distributor chooses the o⁄er, (wI
f;0), and the entrant distributor ac-
cepts the o⁄er (c;￿m(c+dE)) from the free manufacturer. The incumbent distributor￿ s cost
becomes CI = wI
f + dI ￿ pm(c + dE) and the entrant distributor￿ s cost becomes c + dE.
11If f is positive, a distributor pays the manufacturer a fee. If f is negative, a distributor receives as a
compensation or subsidy from the manufacturer.
12As Wright (2009) notes, this prohibits a distributor from receiving additional compensation and buying
the product at a lower wholesale price. According to Wright (2009), if we allow a conditional contract such
that the ￿xed fee payment realizes only when the distributor actually purchase from the manufacturer, this
problem can be solved.
13(ii-4) The retail price becomes pm(c+dE) and the entrant distributor wins the competition.
Both incumbent distributor and the entrant distributor obtain zero. The free manufacturer
obtains positive pro￿t ￿m(c + dE).
(iii) If S ￿ N ￿ 2, (iii-1)￿ (iii-4) are the equilibrium outcomes.
(iii-1) The entrant distributor enters the market.
(iii-2) N ￿ 2 (or less) signed manufacturers o⁄er (c;0) to the incumbent distributor, and
the free manufacturers o⁄er (c;0) to both the incumbent distributor and entrant distributor.
(iii-3) Both of the distributors accept the o⁄er (c;0). The choice of manufacturer for the
purchase does not a⁄ect the result.
(iii-4) The retail price becomes c + dI and the entrant distributor wins the competition.
The entrant distributor obtains (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI). The incumbent distributor and all
manufacturers obtain zero pro￿t.
Proof. See Appendix.
The crucial point of this Lemma 2 is that the free manufacturer can obtain the monopoly
pro￿t ￿m(c + dE) if S = N ￿ 1. The free manufacturer employs a "divide-and-conquer"
type strategy. By o⁄ering a very high wholesale price and a (small) negative ￿xed fee to the
incumbent distributor, the free manufacturer can avoid a retail price competition and obtain
the monopoly pro￿t by o⁄ering the ￿xed fee, ￿m(c+dE), to the entrant distributor. Similar
strategy is also employed in Wright (2009), wherein an incumbent manufacturer o⁄ers
exclusive dealing contracts to deter an entrant manufacturer.13 In Wright (2009), however,
this strategy reduces the pro￿t of a free distributor and enhances the entry deterrence.
Why do this paper and Wright(2009) derive such opposite results? The reason is simple.
In Wright(2009), the "divide-and-conquer" strategy employed by the entrant manufacturer
raises its pro￿t and reduces the pro￿t of the free distributor. Hence, it reduces the incentive
to become a free distributor. On the other hand, in this paper, the "divide-and-conquer"
strategy employed by the free manufacturer raises its pro￿t, and it raises the incentive to
become a free manufacturer.
13Wright (2009) is a comment on Fumagalli and Motta (2006) regarding two-part tari⁄wholesale pricing
with some correction of the proofs.
14Next, we consider the equilibrium of the entire game with this lemma. The incumbent
distributor obtains ￿m(c+dI) if S = N. On the other hand, if the entrant enters the market,
the incumbent obtains zero if S < N. It follows that it is necessary that all manufacturers
sign the exclusive dealing contracts to exclude the entrant. Hence, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 If manufacturers can o⁄er two-part tari⁄ contracts, the incumbent distrib-
utor cannot deter the entry of any number of manufacturers.
Proof. The incumbent distributor should o⁄er compensation x of at least ￿m(c + dE). If
S = N, the incumbent￿ s pro￿t is ￿m(c + dI) and it is strictly less than ￿m(c + dE). Thus,
the incumbent cannot induce all the manufacturers to sign the exclusive contracts.
This result is opposite to the existing literature, where the incumbent manufacturer
tries to deter the rival￿ s entry by an exclusive dealing contract. Wright (2009) shows that
by correcting Fumagalli and Motta (2006), a two-part tari⁄ enables the incumbent man-
ufacturer to deter the e¢ cient entry. Abito and Wright (2008) also show that a unique
exclusion equilibrium exists when the manufacturer o⁄ers a two-part tari⁄even if distribu-
tors are not di⁄erentiated, as in our model.14 In our model, however, there exists a unique
entry equilibrium when an incumbent distributor tries to deter the rival￿ s entry.
The di⁄erence stems from the fact that the free manufacturer has a monopoly position
trading with the entrant distributor who has more e¢ cient technology. The free man-
ufacturer can use the two-part tari⁄ contract which is powerful tool to absorb the rent
the entrant will obtain at the retail market. On the other hand, in the existing literature
model where the incumbent manufacturer intends to capture all distributors in order to de-
ter the rival￿ s entry, the two-part tari⁄scheme gives manufacturers larger bargaining power.
Therefore, the deviation from signing the exclusive dealing contract is less pro￿table for
each distributor. This makes exclusion more feasible.
Lastly, we should examine the case where the entrant pays a positive ￿xed entry cost
F > 0. Even if the entrant has to pay the entry cost, our result does not change as long as
14The main di⁄erence between Wright (2009) and Abito and Wright(2008) is in ￿xed operation costs for
distributors. Wright (2009) assumes that distributors should cover ￿xed costs to be active, otherwise they
will remain inactive. Abito and Wright (2008) do not assume such operation costs.
15the free manufacturer can o⁄er the two-part tari⁄contract at the time of the entry decision.
By o⁄ering (c;￿m(c+dE)￿F) to the entrant distributor, the free manufacturer can absorb
all the rent. Hence, in this case, as long as ￿m(c + dI) < ￿m(c + dE) ￿ F, the incumbent
distributor cannot deter the entry for any number of manufacturers.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a model where an incumbent distributor facing an e¢ cient entry
threat tries to deter the entry by o⁄ering exclusive dealing contracts with all manufac-
turers. We have shown that an incumbent distributor can deter an e¢ cient rival￿ s entry
as long as the number of manufacturers is su¢ ciently small, when the manufacturers are
using linear wholesale price contracts. Otherwise, entry occurs. The incumbent distribu-
tor should o⁄er positive compensation to each manufacturer to induce it sign the contract
even if no product di⁄erentiation exists. In order to o⁄er all manufacturers the required
compensation, the number of manufacturers should be lower than a certain level. This con-
trasts with Simpson and Wickelgren (2007) and other existing literature on the incumbent
manufacturer￿ s exclusion of e¢ cient entry by exclusive dealing contracts. In these papers,
as product di⁄erentiation diminishes, the compensation approaches zero. Thus, no matter
how many distributors exist, exclusion occurs with fully signed exclusive dealing contracts
in almost homogenous product market.
This is clearly shown in the analysis of two-part tari⁄ wholesale contracts. With a
two-part tari⁄, manufacturers have strong bargaining power against distributors. In par-
ticular, if only one manufacturer rejects the exclusive dealing contract, it can behave as a
monopolist. Thus, the incumbent cannot a⁄ord the necessary compensation for even one
manufacturer to sign the exclusive dealing contract.
Considering the implications of antitrust issues, we do not conclude that exclusion is
less likely when an e¢ cient entry occurs at the distribution level in comparison to the
manufacture level. Otherwise, we argue that allocation of bargaining power between man-
ufacturers and distributors is crucial for exclusion to occur at the equilibrium. Thus, the
antitrust authority should examine which sector initiates the exclusive dealing contracts
16and which sector has bargaining power, when it estimates the anti-competitive e⁄ect of
such contracts.
A Appendix
This appendix proves Lemma 2. We examine three cases, (i), (ii), (iii), separately.
(i) S = N. The situation is almost same as the case where manufacturers use linear
wholesale pricing. Even if a signed manufacturer can use the two-part tari⁄, it cannot o⁄er
a positive ￿xed fee since there is a price competition among signed manufacturers. Hence,
all signed manufacturers o⁄er (c;0) and the entrant cannot enter the market. Since the
incumbent obtains the product at the cost c, the pro￿t of the incumbent becomes ￿m(c+dI)
with the retail price pm(c + dI).
(ii) S = N ￿ 1. First, we check the deviation incentives of distributors. If the entrant
distributor rejects the o⁄er from the free manufacturer, it cannot trade with any manufac-
turer and cannot get any positive pro￿t. Hence, the entrant distributor has no incentive
to reject the o⁄er from the free manufacturer. If the incumbent rejects the o⁄er from the
free manufacturer and accepts the o⁄er from the signed manufacturers, (c;0), the cost for
the incumbent becomes CI = c + dI. In the meantime, the marginal cost for the entrant
distributor is CE = c + dE. By the retail price competition, the incumbent loses the com-
petition and obtains nothing. In addition, each signed manufacturer obtains zero in this
case. On the other hand, if the incumbent accept the free manufacturer￿ s o⁄er, it obtains
zero as well. Thus, the incumbent has no incentive to deviate.
Second, we check the deviation incentive of signed manufacturers. If a signed man-
ufacturer o⁄ers w > c, the incumbent cannot win the retail price competition by ac-
cepting the o⁄er. It means that the incumbent accepts the o⁄er only when the ￿xed
fee is su¢ ciently negative. However, the deviated manufacturer cannot sell its product
and cannot get any positive revenue by this wholesale contract. Thus, o⁄ering w > c
is not pro￿table for a signed manufacturer. Next, we consider the case where w < c
and f > 0. The incumbent distributor accepts the o⁄er only when w < c ￿ (dI ￿ dE)
and it can obtain non-negative pro￿t. That is, (c + dE ￿ w ￿ dI)X(c + dE) ￿ f should
17be non-negative, i.e., f must be equal or smaller than (c + dE ￿ w ￿ dI)X(c + dE).
However, the deviated (signed) manufacturer￿ s pro￿t becomes (w ￿ c)X(c + dE) + f ￿
(w ￿ c)X(c + dE) + (c + dE ￿ w ￿ dI)X(c + dE) = (dE ￿ dI)X(c + dE) < 0. Hence, signed
manufacturers have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium behavior.
Third, we check the deviation incentive of the free manufacturer. Under the equilibrium
strategy, the free manufacturer can obtain ￿m(c+dE). Obviously, c+dE is the minimum cost
under the e¢ cient production-distribution plan and ￿m(c+dE) is the attainable maximum
pro￿t under the plan. This means that it is impossible for the free manufacturer to obtain
higher pro￿t than ￿m(c + dE). Thus, the free manufacturer has no incentive to deviate.
(iii) S = N ￿ 2. First, it is obvious that distributors do not have incentive to deviate
from the equilibrium behavior since all o⁄ers from manufacturers are the same. Second, we
check the deviation incentive of manufacturers. Suppose that a signed manufacturer o⁄ers
(w;f) 6= (c;0). If w > c, the incumbent does not accept the o⁄er since it cannot win the
retail price competition. Therefore, we only consider the case where w < c and f > 0. The
incumbent distributor accepts the o⁄er only when w < c ￿ (dI ￿ dE) and it can obtain a
non-negative pro￿t. That is, (c+dE ￿w￿dI)X(c+dE)￿f should be non-negative, i.e., f
must be equal or smaller than (c+dE ￿w ￿dI)X(c+dE). However, the deviated (signed)
manufacturer￿ s pro￿t becomes (w ￿ c)X(c + dE) + f ￿ (w ￿ c)X(c + dE) + (c + dE ￿ w ￿
dI)X(c + dE) = (dE ￿ dI)X(c + dE) < 0. Hence, signed manufacturers have no incentive
to deviate from the equilibrium behavior.
Third, let us examine the deviation incentive of a free manufacturer (called ￿deviator￿ )
who o⁄ers (wI;fI) to the incumbent and (wE;fE) to the entrant. Suppose that the deviator
o⁄ers (wI;fI) = (c;0) and (wE;fE) 6= (c;0). If wE + dE ￿ c + dI, the entrant distributor
wins the retail competition and earns (c+dI￿wE￿dE)X(c+dI)￿fE by accepting (wE;fE).
On the other hand, by accepting (c;0) (which is o⁄ered by other free manufacturers), the
entrant obtains (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI). Thus, to induce the entrant to accept (wE;fE),
(c + dI ￿ wE ￿ dE)X(p) ￿ fE ￿ (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI), i.e., (c ￿ wE)X(c + dI) ￿ fE must
be satis￿ed. This means, however, the deviator￿ s pro￿t becomes (wE ￿ c)X(c + dI) + fE
￿ (wE ￿ c)X(c + dI) + (c ￿ wE)X(c + dI) = 0. It means the deviation is not pro￿table.
Moreover, the entrant never accepts the o⁄er (wE;fE) if wE + dE > c + dI, because the
18deviator-entrant combination cannot win the retail competition and the deviator has no
mean to compensate (dI ￿ dE)X(c + dI) to the entrant.
Next let us suppose that the deviator o⁄ers (wI;fI) 6= (c;0) and (wE;fE) = (c;0). If
wI+dI ￿ c+dE and the incumbent accepts the o⁄er (wI;fI), the incumbent distributor wins
the retail competition and earns (c+dE￿wI ￿dI)X(c+dE)￿fI. On the other hand, if the
incumbent accept (c;0) o⁄ered from the other free manufacturers, the incumbent cannot
win the competition and gets zero. Thus, to induce the incumbent to accept (wI;fI),
(c + dE ￿ wI ￿ dI)X(c + dE) ￿ fI ￿ 0 is required. However, the deviator￿ s pro￿t becomes
(wI ￿ c)X(c + dE) + fI ￿ (wI ￿ c)X(c + dE) + (c + dE ￿ wI ￿ dI)X(c + dE) < 0. Thus,
the deviation is not pro￿table. Moreover, if wI + dI > c + dE, the incumbent cannot get a
positive bene￿t and cannot accept the o⁄er.
Then, we consider the case where (wI;fI) 6= (c;0) and (wE;fE) 6= (c;0), and both









where p￿ denotes the retail market price and p￿ = min(wI + dI;pm(wE + dE)). The pro￿t








If the entrant rejects the o⁄er (wE;fE) and accepts (c;0) o⁄ered by the other free
manufacturer, it obtains
￿E = (~ p ￿ c ￿ dE)X(~ p);
where ~ p = min(wI + dI;pm(c + dE)). Hence, ￿d
E ￿ ￿E , fE ￿ (p￿ ￿ wE ￿ dE)X(p￿) ￿
(~ p ￿ c ￿ dE)X(~ p) must be satis￿ed when the entrant accepts (wE;fE). In this case, the
deviator￿ s pro￿t becomes (wE￿c)X(p￿)+fE+fI. We can show that (wE￿c)X(p￿)+fE ￿
(wE￿c)X(p￿)+(p￿￿wE￿dE)X(p)￿(~ p￿c￿dE)X(~ p) = (p￿￿c￿dE)X(p￿)￿(~ p￿c￿dE)X(~ p).
Obviously ~ p = argmax (p ￿ c ￿ dE)X(p) under the constraint that p ￿ wI + dI. It follows
(p￿￿c￿dE)X(p￿)￿(~ p￿c￿dE)X(~ p) ￿ 0, and thus, (wE ￿c)X(p)+fE ￿ 0. On the other
hand, fI must be negative, since the incumbent distributor cannot win the retail price
19competition by accepting the o⁄er from the deviator. Hence, ￿d
f = fI +(wE￿c)X(p￿)+fE
cannot be positive.
Even if wE + dE > wI + dI, the situation is almost same. In this case, the deviator￿ s
pro￿t becomes ￿d
f = fI +(wI ￿c)X(p￿￿)+fE where p￿￿ = min(wE +dE;pm(wI +dI)) and
fE cannot be positive to compensate the entrant. On the other hand, by accepting the
o⁄er from the deviator, the incumbent obtains (p￿￿￿wI￿dI)X(p￿￿)￿fE. By rejecting this
o⁄er and contracting with the other free manufacturer, it obtains (￿ p ￿ c ￿ dI)X(￿ p), where
￿ p = min(wE +dE;pm(c+dE)). Hence, when the incumbent accepts the deviator￿ s o⁄er, the
following condition should be satis￿ed: (p￿￿ ￿ wI ￿ dI)X(p￿￿) ￿ fE ￿ (￿ p ￿ c ￿ dI)X(￿ p) ,
fE ￿ (p￿￿ ￿wI ￿dI)X(p￿￿)￿(￿ p￿c￿dI)X(￿ p). In this case, the deviator￿ s pro￿t becomes
(wI ￿c)X(p￿￿)+fI +fE. We can show that (wI ￿c)X(p￿￿)+fI ￿ (wI ￿c)X(p￿￿)+(p￿￿￿
wI ￿ dI)X(p￿￿) ￿ (￿ p ￿ c ￿ dI)X(￿ p) = (p￿￿ ￿ c ￿ dI)X(p￿￿) ￿ (￿ p ￿ c ￿ dI)X(￿ p) ￿ 0: Thus,
the deviator obtains non-positive pro￿t. Thus, it has no incentive to deviate.
In summary, there is no deviation incentive when S ￿ N ￿ 2: Note that even if S = 0
(there is no signed manufacturer), all free manufacturers can trade with the incumbent
distributor and o⁄er (c;0) to both the incumbent distributor and the entrant distributor.
Thus, analysis above can be applied to this extreme case.
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